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This paper investigates the determinants of the choice between two alternative methods of
pooling similar and complementary assets: the merger/acquisition and the greenﬁeld equity
joint venture. Two theories of the determinants of that choice are tested on a sample of
Japanese investments in the United States. The results show that equity joint ventures are
preferred over acquisitions when the desired assets are linked to nondesired assets because
the U.S. ﬁrm owning them is large and not divisionalized, when the Japanese investor has
little previous experience of the American market and hence seeks to avoid postmerger
integration problems, when the Japanese investor and the U.S. partner manufacture the same
product, and when the industry entered is growing neither very rapidly nor very slowly.
INTRODUCTION are high. They are lower when the acquirer and
the target ﬁrm are based in the same industry,
and hence in that case they expect acquisitions. This paper investigates the determinants of the
choice between two alternative methods of pool- Hennart (1988), on the other hand, argues that
a ﬁrm will favor acquisitions over joint ventures ing similar and complementary assets: the
merger/acquisition and the greenﬁeld equity joint when the assets it needs are not commingled with
other unneeded assets within the ﬁrm that holds venture. This choice is of particular interest
because it throws light on two competing theories them, and hence can be acquired by buying the
ﬁrm or a part of it. For Hennart, the ‘digestibility’ of why joint ventures exist. Balakrishnan and
Koza (1991, 1993) see joint ventures as a mech- of the targeted assets, itself a function of the size
and organizational structure of the ﬁrm that owns anism to reduce the transaction costs incurred
when acquiring other ﬁrms. They predict that them, is the crucial determinant of the choice
between joint ventures and acquisitions. Thus joint ventures will be preferred when the potential
target and the acquirer belong to different indus- while Balakrishnan and Koza are concerned with
transaction costs in the market for ﬁrms, Hen- tries, because in this case these transaction costs
nart’s focus is on the costs of integrating the
target ﬁrm’s labor force (what has been called
the postacquisition integration problem). Looking Key words: joint ventures; acquisitions; foreign mar-
ket entry strategies at the choice between joint ventures and acqui-
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sition hence allows us to sharpen our understand- Indivisibilities
ing of the strategic logic for the choice between
these two forms of ﬁrm growth. One potential impediment to acquisitions is when
the desired assets are hard to disentangle from The next section positions the paper within the
joint venture literature. We then examine the nondesired ones (Hennart, 1988). Assume that a
biotechnology ﬁrm needs access to a sales force choice between acquisitions and greenﬁeld joint
ventures. The speciﬁc hypotheses derived in this to successfully introduce a new drug. If it were
to buy a pharmaceutical ﬁrm to obtain its sales section are tested in the following two sections
on a sample of Japanese manufacturing entries in force, it would also be buying many assets which
are not needed and which are difﬁcult to disen- the United States. The results show that joint
ventures are preferred over acquisitions when the tangle from the sales force, and hence difﬁcult
to divest afterwards. For example, the need to desired assets are ‘indigestible’, i.e., when they
are commingled with nondesired assets because vertically integrate drug manufacture and its dis-
tribution may make it impossible to acquire the the U.S. ﬁrm owning them is large and not
divisionalized. Joint ventures are also chosen sales force without acquiring drug manufacture
as well. A small biotechnology company would when the Japanese investor has had no previous
experience of the American market and hence be encumbered by these assets, and would incur
high costs in managing them (Shan, 1988). By seeks to avoid postmerger integration problems,
when the Japanese investor and the U.S. partner contrast, a joint venture allows the biotechnology
ﬁrm to access the pharmaceutical ﬁrm’s sales manufacture the same product, and when the
industry entered is growing neither very rapidly force without having to manage it. Hence the
fact that a partner’s desired assets are linked to nor very slowly.
its nondesired assets, while it makes acquisitions
costly, does not cause problems for joint ventures,
since the ﬂow of services from the assets counts JOINT VENTURES VS. ACQUISITIONS
as a contribution to the joint venture, yet is still
available for the parent’s other businesses. Joint Assume that a foreign investor plans to exploit
some of its competencies in the U.S. market, but ventures may therefore be preferred when the
desired assets are not easily separable from the needs to combine them with U.S.-based inputs.
If markets for both the competencies and the many other assets owned by the parent. This is
likely to be the case when the parents are large U.S.-based inputs are subject to high transaction
costs, an equity joint venture will be the most and not divisionalized. Acquisitions, on the other
hand, will be chosen when the parents are small, efﬁcient way to combine the complementary
inputs (if one of the two inputs—say the U.S. or if they are large, when they are organized in
quasi-independent divisions which can be input—could be obtained with low transaction
costs by the foreign investor, then the foreign acquired separately from the rest of the ﬁrm, i.e.,
when they are divisionalized (Kay, Robe, and ﬁrm would set up a wholly-owned subsidiary on
U.S. soil, and would obtain the complementary Zagnolli, 1987).
local input through spot sales or contract; if both
inputs could be obtained with low transaction Management costs costs, then no foreign direct investment would
take place) (Hennart, 1982, 1988). When a foreign ﬁrm acquires a local ﬁrm, it
acquires an existing corps of employees, with There is, however, an alternative to joint ven-
tures when markets for two or more inputs held their own routines and culture. Integrating such
employees is difﬁcult, particularly so if there are by two or more separate ﬁrms are simultaneously
failing. That solution is the merging of the ﬁrms cultural differences between the two ﬁrms
(Jemison and Sitkin, 1986). These cultural differ- holding the complementary inputs (in our case
having the foreign investor buy the local ﬁrm ences may arise because ﬁrms come from differ-
ent industries or countries. In contrast, a joint which owned the U.S.-based inputs, the local ﬁrm
buy the foreign investor, or having them merge). venture safeguards the incentives that employees
of both ﬁrms have to maximize the proﬁts of Why then choose joint ventures over acqui-
sitions? There are four main reasons. the joint venture. The management of the jointChoice Between Mergers/Acquisitions and Joint Ventures 3
venture’s labor force can therefore be left to the of entering ﬁrms and on those of the U.S. sectors
entered. Singh and Kogut hypothesized that the local partner (Kogut and Singh, 1988). Hence
joint ventures may be preferred over acquisitions problems of valuing acquisitions were higher in
R&D intensive industries and hence that entries by ﬁrms which are inexperienced in managing a
foreign labor force, and by ﬁrms venturing out- in these industries were more likely to be joint
ventures. They found that joint ventures were side their core industry.
preferred to acquisitions when the U.S. industry
entered was R&D intensive, when the foreign Difﬁculties in assessing the value of the investor had little experience of the U.S. market, target ﬁrm and when the targeted venture was large.
Neither of these two studies examined what For Balakrishnan and Koza (1991, 1993), joint
ventures are desired when acquirers do not know can be called the ‘digestibility’ of the targeted
U.S. assets. Kogut and Singh (1988) argue that the value of the assets desired. A joint venture
is an efﬁcient vehicle for reducing these infor- acquisitions will be discouraged the larger the
assets of the afﬁliate, but do not provide a ration- mation costs because it makes it possible both to
gather additional information on the value of the ale for this prediction. In Singh and Kogut
(1989), the hypothesis is that large investments partner’s assets and to rescind the relationship at
relatively low cost. Hence joint ventures should are more risky than small ones. Hence investors
enter through joint ventures to share that risk be preferred to acquisitions when the ﬁrms com-
bining assets have little knowledge of each other’s with their partners. The size of the venture is
deﬁned as the assets of the acquired unit (in the business, i.e., when they are in different industries
(Balakrishnan and Koza, 1991). case of acquisition) or that of the U.S. partner
(in the case of joint ventures). This speciﬁcation
introduces a bias if, as we expect, acquisitions Governmental and institutional barriers are systematically associated with small afﬁliate
size (but not necessarily small partner size, since In some countries foreign acquisitions are banned
in some or all sectors, or are made difﬁcult by the acquired unit may be a division of a large
ﬁrm). By measuring afﬁliate size by the assets legal restrictions on voting rights, cross-holdings
(Japan), and bank and family control (Germany of the acquired unit in the case of acquisitions,
and by those of the partner in the case of joint and Italy, respectively) (Lightfoot, 1992).
Kogut and Singh (1988) and Singh and Kogut ventures, the authors bias the test towards sig-
niﬁcance of their size variable. A correct speciﬁ- (1989) provide the only empirical evidence on
the factors that determine the choice between cation should be neutral vis-a `-vis the outcome,
i.e., it should consider partner size in the case of acquisitions and joint ventures. Kogut and Singh
(1988) looked at entries by foreign multinational both acquisition and joint ventures. Assets are
also a poor proxy for the magnitude of postacqui- ﬁrms into the United States. They argued that a
main disadvantage of entering through acquisition sition management problems. Because of this and
other problems with the empirical analysis, further was the high management cost involved in inte-
grating the target ﬁrm’s labor force and that the research into the determinants of the choice
between acquisitions and joint ventures is war- disadvantage would be greater the greater the
cultural distance between the investor’s home ranted.1
base and the United States. As expected, they
found that joint ventures were preferred to acqui-
1 These two studies also failed to control for another important
determinant of the choice between acquisitions and joint sitions when the entrant’s home country was cul-
ventures: whether acquisitions were more likely when the turally distant from the United States. Joint ven- U.S. investment represented a diversiﬁcation for the parent.
This variable was found to be signiﬁcant in Hennart and Park tures were also preferred when the U.S. operation
(1993). Singh and Kogut also argue that the faster the rate was large and when the U.S. industry entered
of growth of the U.S. industry entered, the more likely entry was R&D intensive. The parent’s experience of through acquisition, neglecting the fact that acquisitions may
be preferred in low growth industries because they allow the U.S. market was not signiﬁcant.
entry without adding to capacity (Caves and Mehra, 1986). The design and the data sources in Singh and
Lastly, the data set of these two studies includes entries in Kogut (1989) are similar to Kogut and Singh the manufacturing, extractive, and service industries. Since
assets per employee are lower in services and higher in (1988), but the emphasis is on the characteristics4 J.-F. Hennart and S. Reddy
RESEARCH DESIGN AND TESTABLE it is likely that the assets desired by the Japanese
investor make up 100 percent of the assets held PROPOSITIONS
by the U.S. ﬁrm. If the target ﬁrm is large
but divisionalized, it is possible for the Japanese The focus of our empirical analysis is the choice
made by Japanese investors into the United States investor to acquire only the division that owns
the desired resources. Acquisitions become prob- between full acquisitions of U.S. ﬁrms (hereafter
acquisitions) and greenﬁeld joint ventures lematic when the partner is large, but not di-
visionalized. Then it is difﬁcult to separate between Japanese and American ﬁrms (henceforth
joint ventures). This focus on Japanese entries in desired from nondesired assets, and an acquisition
would involve having to operate at a scale and/or the United States has three main advantages.
First, because the United States has both negli- in industries which do not ﬁt well with the
Japanese ﬁrm’s business. In contrast, services of gible government and structural barriers to acqui-
sitions, we avoid the problem of having to control the desired assets can be obtained through a joint
venture without having to change the ownership for them.
2 Second, studying parents based in a
single country controls for the impact of national of these assets, and hence without having to
disentangle them from nondesired assets. Hence: cultural differences in the mode of entry (Kogut
and Singh, 1988), differences which are very
difﬁcult to model. Third, Japanese entries are less Hypothesis 1: Acquisitions will be preferred
to joint ventures when the desired assets are skewed towards acquisitions than those of other
countries, hence giving us a more balanced sam- ‘digestible’, i.e., when the size of the U.S.
partner is small, or if it is large, when the ple.3
We deﬁne the American partner as the ﬁrm U.S. partner is divisionalized.
which holds the assets which the Japanese inves-
tor needs. When the entry is a joint venture, the One of the main disadvantages of acquisitions
relative to joint ventures is the high cost of partner is the American parent of the venture.
When the entry is an acquisition, the American integrating the target’s ﬁrm’s labor force. Such
costs are likely to be particularly high for partner may or may not be the same as the
acquired ﬁrm, as in some cases Japanese ﬁrms Japanese ﬁrms, because acquisitions are very rare
in Japan, and hence purely domestic Japanese have acquired divisions of divisionalized U.S.
parents. In that case, the partner is the di- ﬁrms have very little experience with them.4 By
contrast, joint ventures with U.S. ﬁrms are a less visionalized parent. If the U.S. partner is small,
risky way to test the feasibility of transferring
the Japanese system to the United States, as the
extractive industries, the size variable may reﬂect systematic case of Toyota shows.
interindustry patterns. Japanese ﬁrms are likely to expect their postac-
2 The United States is one of the few countries which has quisition integration costs to be lower the longer minimal restrictions on foreign ownership, and none for manu-
facturing enterprises (Price Waterhouse, 1991). Even foreign they have been in the United States. Hence:
acquisitions of high-technology ﬁrms have been unregulated.
Until the passage of the Exon-Florio amendment to the Omni- Hypothesis 2: Acquisitions will be preferred bus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 the U.S. govern-
ment had no power to block the acquisition of a U.S. ﬁrm to joint ventures when the Japanese investor
when this was deemed to be a threat to national security. has a long experience of the U.S. environment.
The Exon-Florio amendment stipulates that cases of potential
concern are notiﬁed to the Committee on Foreign Investment
in the United States (CFIUS) which initiates an inquiry. Because company cultures and administrative rou-
If the Committee recommends blocking the acquisition, the
President can do so. However, since 1988 only 13 proposed
investments (from 750 notiﬁcations) have received more than
4 Many recent Japanese acquisitions of U.S. ﬁrms have fared
poorly because of serious problems encountered in integrating a cursory review, and only one has been blocked. The consen-
sus of observers is that, in the period under study (1978– the subsidiary. Sanyo was unable to transfer its work and
production organization to the television plant it bought from 89), the United States had no really binding restrictions on
foreign acquisitions of US ﬁrms in technologically advanced Warwick in Forrest City, Arkansas, because of resistance by
unions and by the U.S. management team it left in place. industries.
3 For example, acquisitions made up only 31 percent of the The company ended up shifting production of TVs to its
other plants in the U.S. and Mexico (Kenney and Florida, 114 Japanese entries in the United States in the Kogut and
Singh sample, compared to 54 percent for the all-nationality 1993). The acquisition of Firestone by Bridgestone has also
been painful (Economist, 1991). sample (Kogut and Singh, 1988, Table 2).Choice Between Mergers/Acquisitions and Joint Ventures 5
tines differ systematically across industries, we foreign, attracts more opposition if it is achieved
via an acquisition rather than via a joint ven- would expect postacquisition integration problems
to be lower for Japanese investors whose U.S. ture, then:
subsidiary manufactures the same product as they
do. Therefore: Hypothesis 5a: Joint ventures will be pre-
ferred to acquisitions for Japanese entries into
concentrated U.S. industries. Hypothesis 3: Acquisitions will be preferred
to joint ventures when the Japanese investor is
in the same industry as the planned subsidiary. On the other hand, one advantage of acquisitions
is that they do not create additional capacity, and
hence are less threatening to incumbents. As noted earlier, Balakrishnan and Koza have
argued that joint ventures are a way to reduce
the uncertainty concerning the value of the com- Hypothesis 5b: Acquisitions will be preferred
to joint ventures when the entry is in a concen- plementary assets brought together, and one
implication they have drawn is that trated U.S. industry.
joint ventures should occur more frequently Because of these two offsetting factors, the
between parents who are in industries that are impact of concentration on entry is unclear.
relatively unrelated to one another. Firms that Because our study compares full acquisitions to are in unrelated industries are not likely to have
greenﬁeld joint ventures, we must control for sufﬁcient knowledge or may require costly ‘help’
factors that push ﬁrms towards acquisitions over to evaluate complementary assets. (Balakrishnan
and Koza, 1991: 24) greenﬁeld entry (whether through wholly owned
or joint ventured units). Acquisitions have two
main advantages over greenﬁelds: they permit Hence:
faster entry, since it takes longer to build a
subsidiary from scratch than to buy a going con- Hypothesis 4: Joint ventures will be preferred
to acquisitions when the Japanese and Amer- cern. In contrast to greenﬁeld plants, acquisitions
also do not add capacity. Hence acquisitions are ican partners are in a different industry.
encouraged when the U.S. industry entered grows
either very fast or very slowly. Acquisitions are By contrast, Hennart’s (1988) theory has no
strong implications as to whether joint ventures desired when the target industry grows very
quickly, because then the opportunity cost of are more or less likely to be preferred to acqui-
sitions when the partners are in the same industry. greenﬁeld entry is high; acquisitions also make
sense when the target industry is growing very Link joint ventures are often established to com-
bine the knowledge assets of ﬁrms in two differ- slowly or is declining, because a greenﬁeld entry
would then add capacity which would depress ent industries. Partners in scale joint ventures are
often in the same industry. The same goes for proﬁts (Caves and Mehra, 1986; Hennart and
Park, 1993). acquisitions. Hence whether or not the partners
are in the same industry should have no impact
on the way they choose to combine their assets. Hypothesis 6: Acquisitions will be preferred
to joint ventures when the U.S. industry Lastly, we must control for antitrust policies
and the rate of growth of the target market. Kay entered is growing very rapidly or very slowly.
et al. (1987), quoting Nelson (1982), argue that
while U.S. antitrust authorities frown upon acqui-
sitions and joint ventures between U.S. ﬁrms in
concentrated industries, they are more tolerant of METHODOLOGY AND DEPENDENT
VARIABLE joint ventures if the partner is foreign. According
to Berg and Friedman (1978), U.S. antitrust au-
thorities see horizontal joint ventures in a more Our sample of Japanese manufacturing entries in
the United States was obtained from two separate positive light than full horizontal acquisitions. If,
as seems to be the case, the combination of two censuses undertaken periodically by Toyo Keizai
and by the Japan Economic Institute. An acqui- ﬁrms with market power, one domestic and one6 J.-F. Hennart and S. Reddy
sition takes place when a Japanese parent fully greenﬁeld joint venture with an American ﬁrm.
We use a binomial logistic model in which the acquires an existing U.S. manufacturing company
or parts thereof. A joint venture occurs when a regression coefﬁcients estimate the impact of the
independent variables on the probability that the Japanese investor establishes a new manufactur-
ing facility and shares the ownership with an entry will be through a joint venture, with a
positive sign for the coefﬁcient meaning that the American partner (hence partial acquisitions are
excluded). The unit of observation is the entry.5 variable increases that probability.
Table 2 provides the mean and standard devi- There were 428 such entries established between
1978 and 1989, of which 244 were acquisitions ation of the variables.8 The dummy INDIG cap-
tures the indigestibility of the assets coveted by (57%), and 184 were joint ventures (43%). Data
for the independent variables were compiled from the Japanese investor. INDIG is composed of
SIZE, a dummy equal to 1 if the U.S. partner the Directory of Corporate Afﬁliations, the Japan
Company Handbook, Predicast’s F&S Index Plus who holds them is large, and USSTRUC, a
dummy equal to 1 if the U.S. partner is di- Text, Predicast’s F&S Index Plus Text–
International, and the Census of Manufacturers. visionalized. A large U.S. partner is a U.S. ﬁrm
with more than 5000 employees.
9 The cut-off Lack of information for the independent vari-
ables reduced our sample size to 175 obser- value was empirically estimated by looking at the
size distribution of U.S. partners in our sample. vations.6 This reduction in the sample did not
result in a signiﬁcant bias, since the proportion Changing the cut-off value to other plausible
values (1000 and 2500 employees) does not of joint ventures in our sample (42.9%) is compa-
rable to that of the population as a whole (43%). change the results. Number of employees was
obtained from the issue of the Directory of Cor- The distribution of acquisitions and greenﬁeld
joint ventures for each entry year in our sample porate Afﬁliations published in the year before
the corresponding Japanese entry. is shown in Figure 1.
At the time of entry, the Japanese subsidiaries We ascertained whether the U.S. partner was
divisionalized or not (USSTRUC) by looking at in our sample operated in 16 different 2-digit
SIC industries (see Table 1).
7 Most subsidiaries the ﬁrm’s organizational structure, as described
in the Directory of Corporate Afﬁliations. (138 out of 175 observations) were active in a
single 4-digit SIC industry. U.S. partners range USSTRUC takes a value of 1 if the U.S. partner
was divisionalized, and 0 if it was not. We would in size from 7 to 853,000 employees (between 7
and 367,000 for acquisitions, and between 85 and expect joint ventures to be favored when the U.S.
partner is large and not divisionalized. Hence 853,000 for joint ventures). Slightly less than half
the U.S. partners had a multidivisional structure. INDIG takes a value of 1 when the U.S. partner
is not divisionalized (USSTRUC is 0) and large Mode of entry is captured by a dummy variable
which takes a value of 0 if the Japanese parent (SIZE is 1), and 0 otherwise (the American
partner is small, or is large and divisionalized). made an acquisition and one if it established a
INDIG should enter with a positive sign.
The Japanese investor’s experience of the U.S.
5 Entries by Japanese trading companies were excluded market at the time entry was made (JEXP) is because of the fundamental differences in strategies between
Japanese trading ﬁrms and their manufacturing counterparts measured by the number of years between entry
(Tsurumi, 1976).
6 The reasons for the reduction from 428 to 175 are as
follows: 57 observations were deleted because the Japanese
parent was a trading company. Ninety-one of the remaining
8 Note that USEMPL and USSTRUC show a different N
(number of observations). However, this does not present a observations were deleted due to missing information on the
U.S. partner. Fifty-one of the remaining observations had problem because neither variable enters into the regression
model directly, and the combined variable INDIG can, under to be dropped due to missing information on size and/or
organizational structure of the U.S. partner. Four additional certain circumstances, be computed with only one compo-
nent present. observations were deleted because of lack of information on
the products of the U.S. partners. Lack of information on the
9 We measure size by employees rather than by sales or assets
because postmerger acquisitions difﬁculties arise from the products of the Japanese investors led to 47 additional
deletions. In one case we did not have the products of the need to integrate and motivate the labor force of the acquired
ﬁrm (Sales and Mirvis, 1984). The larger that labor force, subsidiary. Lastly, lack of information on the employment of
the U.S. partner led to two additional deletions. the greater the difﬁculties. Hence the cost of acquiring a ﬁrm
should be proportional, everything else constant, to the number
7 For data consistency purposes, we used the 1972 Standard
Industrial Classiﬁcation and its 1977 supplement. of its employees.Choice Between Mergers/Acquisitions and Joint Ventures 7
Figure 1. Distribution of joint ventures and acquisitions over time (sample only)
Table 1. Frequency count of Japanese entries into U.S. industries by 2-digit SIC (single industry entries only)
Full
SIC Code: Industry namea acquisitions Joint ventures Total
20: Food and Kindred Products 6 1 7
23: Apparel and Other Textile Products 0 2 2
24: Lumber and Wood Products 1 0 1
25: Furniture and Fixtures 1 2 3
26: Paper and Allied Products 1 2 3
27: Printing and Publishing 1 0 1
28: Chemicals and Allied Products 23 9 32
30: Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastics Products 4 6 10
32: Stone, Clay, and Glass Products 3 4 7
33: Primary Metal Industries 3 10 13
34: Fabricated Metal Products 0 12 12
35: Machinery, Except Electrical 15 6 21
36: Electric and Electronic Equipment 19 10 29
37: Transportation Equipment 1 6 7
38: Instruments and Related Products 4 1 5
39: Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 1 0 1
Total 83 71 154
aClassiﬁcation according to the 1972 Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation Manual and its 1977 Supplement.8
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Table 2. Means and correlations (coefﬁcient/(t-statistic)/cases)
Mean S.D. Freq.
a/N JVAQ CONCEN USEMPL USSTRUC INDIG JEXP PARCOMMON COMMON GROWDEV
JVAQ 75/175 1.000
CONCEN 611.996 512.703 0.025 1.000
(0.329)
N = 175
USEMPL 42617 124064 0.288 0.188 1.000
(3.932) (2.499)
173 173
USSTRUC 81/174 0.293 0.179 0.287 1.000
(4.012) (2.382) (3.899)
174 174 172
INDIG 23/175 0.347 -0.02 -0.013 -0.364 1.000
(4.861) (-0.259) (-0.170) (-5.129)
175 175 173 174
JEXP 5.211 5.803 -0.131 -0.038 0.058 0.047 -0.052 1.000
(-1.744) (-0.498) (0.762) (0.613) (-0.688)
175 175 173 174 175
PARCOMMON 132/175 0.146 0.008 -0.106 0.027 0.065 -0.144 1.000
(1.936) (0.100) (-1.394) (0.356) (0.855) (-1.918)
175 175 173 174 175 174
COMMON 149/175 0.037 0.079 0.061 0.036 0.115 -0.026 0.284 1.000
(0.488) (1.046) (0.802) (0.468) (1.522) (-0.347) (3.897)
175 175 173 174 175 175 175
GROWDEV 0.782 1.082 -0.153 0.097 0.057 -0.017 -0.076 -0.021 -0.06 -0.052 1.000
(-2.032) (1.283) (0.744) (-0.220) (-1.000) (-0.279) (-0.795) (-0.690)
175 175 173 174 175 175 175 175
aFrequency count of dummy = 1.Choice Between Mergers/Acquisitions and Joint Ventures 9
and the establishment of the investor’s ﬁrst U.S. vations with multiple SICs. GROWDEV is high
when the growth rate of the target U.S. industry manufacturing subsidiary. The sign of JEXP
should be negative. The difference in company is either very fast or very slow. Since a high
value of GROWDEV should encourage acqui- culture between the Japanese parent and its sub-
sidiary is proxied by COMMON, which is meas- sitions, its coefﬁcient should be negative.
Table 2 displays the correlation coefﬁcients for ured by a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
Japanese investor and its afﬁliate manufacture one all variables. The matrix of the independent vari-
ables suggests little collinearity. Almost all corre- common product, and to 0 otherwise. COMMON
should have a negative sign. lations are low, the two highest coefﬁcients being
the ones between INDIG and USSTRUC (-0.36) The extent to which the U.S. and the Japanese
ﬁrms have divergent information concerning the and between PARCOMMON and COMMON
(0.28). value of the assets of the U.S. target ﬁrm is
proxied by PARCOMMON, a dummy variable
indicating whether the Japanese and the Amer-
ican partners were in the same industry. PAR- RESULTS
COMMON was calculated by comparing the
products manufactured by the Japanese investor The results of the binomial logistic regression
model are presented in Table 3. A positive coef- and those manufactured by its U.S. partner. In
the case of joint ventures, the partner is the U.S. ﬁcient for an independent variable means that it
tends to increase the probability that a Japanese joint venture partner. In the case of acquisitions,
the partner is the parent ﬁrm of the acquired unit ﬁrm entered through a joint venture. The model
has a high overall explanatory power, with a chi- if the Japanese ﬁrm acquired a division or a part
of a U.S. ﬁrm, or the acquired ﬁrm itself.10 square of 31.55 (p = 0.0001). Table 4 shows that
our model correctly classiﬁes 62.3 percent of the PARCOMMON was coded 1 if at least one of
the products produced by the American partner observations, a rate higher than that which would
be expected by chance.
12 was also produced by the Japanese parent. The
sign of PARCOMMON should be negative. With the exception of PARCOMMON, all sig-
niﬁcant variables have the predicted signs. As The concentration ratio of the U.S. industry
entered (CONCEN) is measured by the Herﬁn- predicted by Hypothesis 1, the coefﬁcient of
INDIG, our measure of the extent to which an dahl index for each 4-digit SIC U.S. industry, as
published in the 1982 Census of Manufactures.11 acquisition would involve the purchase of
unwanted assets, is positive and signiﬁcant at the The arithmetic average of the concentration ratio
was used for subsidiaries active in multiple SICs. 0.1 level. Joint ventures are therefore desired
when the U.S. ﬁrm that holds the assets needed No prediction is made for the sign of this vari-
able. by the Japanese entrant is large and is not di-
visionalized.
13 Following Caves and Mehra (1986) we calcu-
lated GROWDEV to describe the conditions that PARCOMMON is weakly signiﬁcant (at 0.10),
but enters with a positive sign, suggesting that encourage acquisitions. GROWDEV is the abso-
lute value of GROWTH’s deviation from its sam- Japanese investors tend to prefer joint ventures
to acquisitions when the Japanese and American ple mean divided by its standard deviation, with
GROWTH equal to the 3-year average annual partners are in the same industry. This contradicts
Balakrishnan and Koza’s (1991) prediction growth rate of shipments of the 4-digit U.S.
industry 2 years before entry (U.S. Department (Hypothesis 4) that joint ventures should be pre-
ferred when parents are in different industries. of Commerce, U.S. Industrial Outlook). Average
industry growth rate was used for the few obser- Our ﬁndings indicate that acquisitions are more
likely if the partners are in different industries,
10 In the latter case, PARCOMMON and COMMON are iden-
tical.
11 The Herﬁndahl index is calculated by squaring the concen-
12 That rate, equal to a
2 + (1-a)
2, where a is the proportion
of acquisitions (Morrison, 1974), is 51 percent. tration ratio for each of the top 50 companies or the entire
universe (whichever is lower) and summing those squares to a
13 We also ran the model replacing INDIG with a dummy
for size (SIZE is equal to 1 for American partner ﬁrms with cumulative total. See ‘Concentration Ratios in Manufacturing’,
1987 Census of Manufactures, p. X. more than 5000 employees). The results were similar.10 J.-F. Hennart and S. Reddy
Table 3. Parameter estimates for binomial logit model: Greenﬁeld JVs vs. acquisitions (joint ventures = 1)
Coefﬁcients
Variable name Description (t-statistic)
Intercept -0.4533
(0.80)
CONCEN Concentration ratio of U.S. industry entered 0.0002
(0.60)
INDIG Indigestibility of target ﬁrm. Dummy for U.S. partners 2.464***
which are large and not divisionalized (3.74)
JEXP Number of years of presence of the Japanese partner in the -0.043*
U.S. market (1.43)
PARCOMMON U.S. and Japanese partners have one common product 0.642*
(1.52)
COMMON Japanese parent and subsidiary have one common product -0.278
(0.58)
GROWDEV Deviation from the average of the growth of shipments of -0.371**
the U.S. industry entered (1.67)
model chi-square: 31.555 p value: 0.0001
n = 175
***p , 0.01; **p , 0.05; *p , 0.1 (one tailed).
Table 4. Classiﬁcation table target U.S. industry, is negative and signiﬁcant
(at 0.05). As hypothesized in Hypothesis 6, acqui-
Predicted sitions are favored when the target industry
JV Acquisition Total experiences either very high or very low growth
rates.
14
JV 20 55 75 True The coefﬁcient of the concentration ratio of Acquisition 11 89 100
the target U.S. industry is insigniﬁcant. The coef-
Total 31 144 175 ﬁcient of COMMON is not signiﬁcant, suggesting
that similarity of products between the parent and
Sensitivity 26.7% the venture does not increase the probability that
Speciﬁcity 89.0% the Japanese entrant will opt for an acquisition, as
Correct 62.3% we had hypothesized in Hypothesis 3. Yamawaki
(1992) found that Japanese investors choose
acquisitions over greenﬁeld entries when the
investment is into a new industry. Our results and restating them this way points out to a likely
suggest that acquisitions and joint ventures are explanation: there is a strong connection between
both ways to acquire complementary assets, in diversiﬁcation and acquisitions, since acquisitions contrast to greenﬁeld investments, which are used allow entrants to purchase going ﬁrms. This is
to exploit the parent’s advantages.15 The relative often an expensive option, but it is attractive if
entrants do not possess the assets needed to oper-
ate in the industry, i.e., if they are diversifying
14 Hennart and Park (1993) found this to be also true in their (Caves and Mehra, 1986). study of the choice between greenﬁeld entries (both wholly-
owned and joint ventures) and acquisitions by Japanese inves- The coefﬁcient of JEXP is negative and sig-
tors in the United States, while Caves and Mehra (1986) niﬁcant at the 0.10 level. As per Hypothesis 2,
found this variable signiﬁcant for a sample of foreign ﬁrms the longer Japanese ﬁrms have been in the United entering the United States.
15 This is consistent with Kogut and Chang (1991), who found States, the more likely they will choose an acqui-
that differences across industries in the number of greenﬁeld sition over a joint venture. GROWDEV, the coef-
investments was inﬂuenced by the Japanese industry’s level ﬁcient of the absolute value of the deviation from of R&D expenditures, while this variable had no inﬂuence
on entries through joint ventures and acquisitions. the mean in the growth of shipments in theChoice Between Mergers/Acquisitions and Joint Ventures 11
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